Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36238942›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in psychiatry2022

From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry.

Christophe Gauld, Kristopher Nielsen, Manon Job, Hugo Bottemanne, Guillaume Dumas

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychiatry, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Reductionism in Engram Neuroscience.The European journal of neuroscience · 2026
    Review
  2. Article
  3. Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications.World psychiatry : official journal of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) · 2024
    Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Christophe GauldDepartment of Child Psychiatry, Hospices Civils de Lyon, Grenoble, France.
Kristopher NielsenSchool of Psychology, Te Herenga Waka - Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
Manon JobInstitut Jean Nicod, École Normale Supérieure-EHESS, Paris, France.
Hugo BottemanneParis Brain Institute - Institut du Cerveau (ICM), Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM), Center for the National Scientific Research (CNRS), APHP, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, DMU Neuroscience, Sorbonne University, Paris, France.
Guillaume DumasCHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Introduction: Reliance on sole reductionism, whether explanatory, methodological or ontological, is difficult to support in clinical psychiatry. Rather, psychiatry is challenged by a plurality of approaches. There exist multiple legitimate ways of understanding human functionality and disorder, i.e., different systems of representation, different tools, different methodologies and objectives. Pluralistic frameworks have been presented through which the multiplicity of approaches in psychiatry can be understood. In parallel of these frameworks, an enactive approach for psychiatry has been proposed. In this paper, we consider the relationships between the different kinds of pluralistic frameworks and this enactive approach for psychiatry. Methods: We compare the enactive approach in psychiatry with wider analytical forms of pluralism. Results: On one side, the enactive framework anchored both in cognitive sciences, theory of dynamic systems, systems biology, and phenomenology, has recently been proposed as an answer to the challenge of an integrative psychiatry. On the other side, two forms of explanatory pluralisms can be described: a non-integrative pluralism and an integrative pluralism. The first is tolerant, it examines the coexistence of different potentially incompatible or untranslatable systems in the scientific or clinical landscape. The second is integrative and proposes to bring together the different levels of understanding and systems of representations. We propose that enactivism is inherently a form of integrative pluralism, but it is at the same time a component of the general framework of explanatory pluralism, composed of a set of so-called analytical approaches. Conclusions: A significant number of mental health professionals are already accepting the variety of clinical and scientific approaches. In this way, a rigorous understanding of the theoretical positioning of psychiatric actors seems necessary to promote quality clinical practice. The study of entanglements between an analytical pluralism and a synthetic-organizational enactivist pluralism could prove fruitful.

Indexed as

cognitive scienceenactionenaction and embodied cognitionneurosciencepluralismpsychiatry

Identifiers

PMID36238942
PMCPMC9551055

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.