Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36193263›Full record

ArticleSN computer science2022

Checking Contact Tracing App Implementations with Bespoke Static Analysis.

Robert Flood, Sheung Chi Chan, Wei Chen, David Aspinall

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in SN computer science, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
0.3field-weighted citation impact, top 49% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 2 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Robert FloodLFCS, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.ORCID 0000-0001-7171-3364
Sheung Chi ChanMACS, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.
Wei ChenLFCS, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.
David AspinallLFCS, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.
University of Edinburgh · GBHeriot-Watt University · GBThe Alan Turing Institute · GB

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, contact tracing apps have been developed based on digital contact tracing frameworks. These allow developers to build privacy-conscious apps that detect whether an infected individual is in close proximity with others. Given the urgency of the problem, these apps have been developed at an accelerated rate with a brief testing period. Such quick development may have led to mistakes in the apps' implementations, resulting in problems with their functionality, privacy and security. To mitigate these concerns, we develop and apply a methodology for evaluating the functionality, privacy and security of Android apps using the Google/Apple Exposure Notification API. This is a three-pronged approach consisting of a manual analysis, general static analysis and a bespoke static analysis, using a tool we have developed, dubbed MonSTER. As a result, we have found that, although most apps met the basic standards outlined by Google/Apple, there are issues with the functionality of some of these apps that could impact user safety.

Indexed as

AndroidContact tracingCOVID-19MonSTERStatic analysis

Identifiers

PMID36193263
PMCPMC9517973
OpenAlexW4297473628

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.