Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36163037›Full record

ArticleGlobal health research and policy2022

The impact of accountability on local officials' behavior in the pandemic prevention and control in China based on utility maximization.

Shian Zeng, Chengdong Yi

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Article in Global health research and policy, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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4 · The record

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Shian ZengSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, 102206, China. shianzeng@email.cufe.edu.cn.ORCID 0000-0002-3090-7522
Chengdong YiSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, 102206, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic is a public health crisis and an inspection of national governance systems and crisis response capabilities of countries globally. China has adopted a tough accountability system for officials and has succeeded in containing the spread of the pandemic. This study aimed to assess the impact of accountability on local officials' behavior in the pandemic prevention and control based on the official promotion tournament theory and utility maximization analysis framework.

methodsThe panel data of 237 Chinese cities were extracted with local officials' characteristics, confirmed cases, Baidu migration index, Baidu search index according to city names, and data were excluded with local officials' relocation or sub-provincial cities between January 1, 2020 and May 5, 2020. Promotion gain and accountability cost were constructed by adopting promotion speed indicator, and the research hypotheses were assumed based on the utility maximization. It was the first time to apply the interaction model to empirically investigate the relationship between the promotion speed of local officials and the COVID-19 confirmed cases.

resultsOur study showed that the promotion speed of provincial governors and mayors significantly affected the number of confirmed cases (β = - 11.615, P < 0.01). There was a significant interaction between the promotion speeds of provincial governors and mayors (β = - 2594.1, P < 0.01), indicating that they had a coordinated effect on the pandemic control. Additionally, mayors with different promotion speeds made a significant difference in controlling the imported cases and those who promoted faster better controlled the imported cases (β = - 0.841, P < 0.01). Mayors with full-time postgraduate education, titles, and majors in science and engineering had a better effect on controlling the number of confirmed cases.

conclusionsOur study provides evidence that the official accountability system has played an important role in containing the pandemic, which suggests that local officials motivated by the accountability system would respond to the pandemic actively for higher utility. Furthermore, provincial governors and mayors have played a coordinated effect in pandemic control. The above evidences reveal that implementing the official accountability system could improve the government's emergency management capability and the efficiency of pandemic control. Therefore, adopting a strict accountability system could be effective in pandemic containment globally, especially in centralized countries.

Indexed as

COVID-19PandemicsChinaCitiesHumansSocial ResponsibilityOfficial accountability systemOfficials’ behaviorPandemic prevention and controlPublic healthUtility maximization

Identifiers

PMID36163037
PMCPMC9512989

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.