Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36134682›Full record

ArticleWaste management & research : the journal of the International Solid Wastes and Public Cleansing Association, ISWA2023

Evolutionary game model of construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers in the construction and demolition waste resource utilization.

Zhiguo Shao, Mengdi Li, Chuanfeng Han, Lingpeng Meng

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Waste management & research : the journal of the International Solid Wastes and Public Cleansing Association, ISWA, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
1.6field-weighted citation impact, top 19% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 15 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Zhiguo ShaoSchool of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao, China.ORCID 0000-0002-6044-9948
Mengdi LiSchool of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao, China.
Chuanfeng HanSchool of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai, China.
Lingpeng MengChina Institute of FTZ Supply Chain, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, China.
Tongji University · CNQingdao University of Technology · CNShanghai Maritime University · CN

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

With the continuous advancement of urbanization, a huge amount of construction and demolition waste (CDW) is generated in large-scaled construction activities, which has aggravated the problem of environmental pollution, waste of resources and destruction of city appearance. In the context of waste-free city, the recycling of CDW can reduce environmental pollution and promote the sustainable development of a city. However, only 20-30% of CDW in the world is recycled, showing a low rate of global CDW utilization. In order to improve the utilization rate, this paper selects construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers as main participants, applies evolutionary game theory to construct an evolutionary game model on the two parties' decision-making behaviors in CDW recycling, and uses MATLAB to make a numerical simulation. The aim of the model is to analyze the influence of various factors on the parties' decision-making behavior evolution and propose strategies to promote CDW utilization. The study found that the stable state of the CDW resource utilization system mainly depends on the difference between revenue and costs, the initial strategy, and the strength of the external environment; for the government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and the best supervision level is 0.6. In the early stage of resource utilization of CDW, subsidies to construction material manufacturers should be increased to improve their initial participation; public participation can effectively improve the efficiency of government supervision, and its optimal participation level is greater than or equal to 0.4; under weak supervision, government penalty increases alone cannot prevent construction enterprises from illegally disposing of CDW. Therefore, the greater the difference, the positive the initial strategy, and the stronger the external environment, the more the behavior of the two participants tends to be {participation, use}. The results show that the government should establish effective supervision mechanisms and legal systems, improve supervision hotlines and information platforms, encourage the public to participate in CDW management and supervision, set appropriate rewards and punishments, strengthen supervision and management levels, reduce supervision costs, and ensure the effectiveness of construction management to improve the efficiency of cooperation between construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers.

Indexed as

Construction IndustryWaste ManagementConstruction MaterialsGame TheoryHumansIndustrial WasteRecyclingIndustrial WasteConstruction and demolition wasteevolutionary gameexternal environmentnumerical simulation

Identifiers

PMID36134682
PMCPMC9972240
OpenAlexW4296617475

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.