Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36099153›Full record

ArticleEuropean journal of public health2022

Corporate political activity in the context of sugar-sweetened beverage tax policy in the WHO European Region.

Kathrin Lauber, Holly Rippin, Kremlin Wickramasinghe, Anna B Gilmore

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in European journal of public health, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
15citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

15 citing papers in PubMed.

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  9. The bio-food industry's corporate political activity during Health Canada's revision of Canada's food guide.Health promotion and chronic disease prevention in Canada : research, policy and practice · 2023
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Kathrin LauberDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-0073-3004
Holly RippinWHO European Office for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCD Office), Division of Country Health Programmes, WHO Regional Office for Europe, Moscow, Russia.
Kremlin WickramasingheWHO European Office for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCD Office), Division of Country Health Programmes, WHO Regional Office for Europe, Moscow, Russia.
Anna B GilmoreDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, UK.

Funding

Medical Research Council MR/S037519/1World Health Organization 001
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundSugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes have emerged as an effective and increasingly popular tool to reduce added sugar intake, an important contributor to obesity and non-communicable diseases. A common barrier to the implementation of well-designed SSB taxes is the opposition of commercial actors. Focusing on the WHO European Region, this study seeks to map if and how key stakeholders have experienced industry efforts to influence SSB taxes.

methodsWe identified 11 countries in the WHO European Region which have implemented SSB taxes or attempted to do so. Using an online survey informed by the global literature on industry interference with SSB taxation, we approached 70 in-country policymakers, advocates and academics. The data were analysed using an existing framework of corporate political activity.

resultsTwenty-three experts from nine countries responded to the survey. Transnational SSB producers and their business associations were identified as the most active opponents of SSB taxation. Industry claims that the policy would have negative economic effects were identified as the most common and powerful arguments. Direct lobbying was reported in all study countries. Shifts in political activity were recognisable across stages of the policy process, moving from outright opposition to attempts to delay or weaken the policy after its announcement.

conclusionThose seeking to introduce effective SSB taxation can use our findings to pre-empt and counter industry opposition. We identify several measures for preventing and mitigating industry interference with SSB tax policy.

Indexed as

Sugar-Sweetened BeveragesBeveragesHumansPolicyPoliticsSugarsTaxesWorld Health OrganizationSugars

Identifiers

PMID36099153
PMCPMC9527967

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.