Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36015805›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2022

CFRV: A Decentralized Control-Flow Attestation Schema Using Mutual Secret Sharing.

Yuanpei Li, Qinglei Zhou, Bin Li, Yan Zhuang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Yuanpei LiSchool of Cyber Science and Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China.ORCID 0000-0002-3647-4641
Qinglei ZhouSchool of Computer and Artificial Intelligence, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China.ORCID 0000-0002-1156-1108
Bin LiSchool of Computer and Artificial Intelligence, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China.ORCID 0000-0003-3455-4901
Yan ZhuangSchool of Cyber Science and Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Control-flow attestation (CFA) is a mechanism that securely logs software execution paths running on remote devices. It can detect whether a device is being control-flow hijacked by launching a challenge-response process. In the growing landscape of the Internet of Things, more and more peer devices need to communicate to share sensed data and conduct inter-operations without the involvement of a trusted center. Toward the scalability of CFA mechanisms and mitigating the single-point failure, it is important to design a decentralized CFA schema. This paper proposed a decentralized schema (CFRV) to verify the control flow on remote devices. Moreover, it introduces a token (asymmetric secret slices) into peer devices to make the attestation process mutual. In this case, CFRV can mitigate a particular kind of man-in-the-middle attack called

Indexed as

Computer SecuritySoftwareHumanschallenge–responsecontrol-flow attestationinternet of thingssoftware integrity

Identifiers

PMID36015805
PMCPMC9415934

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.