ArticleOmega2023
Adaptive R&D contract for urgently needed drugs: Lessons from COVID-19 vaccine development.
Article in Omega, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 5 citations in OpenAlex.
- A systematic review of global COVID-19 vaccine PPPs: drivers and barriers to governance alignment.Frontiers in public health · 2025Pooled it
- Comparative analysis of C-Reactive protein levels among Non-comorbid, Comorbid, and Multimorbid Hospitalized COVID-19 patients.BMC infectious diseases · 2025Observational
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
This paper analyzes an incentive contract for new vaccine research and development (R&D) under pandemic situations such as COVID-19, considering the R&D contract's adaptability to the pandemic. We study how the public sector (government) designs the adaptive R&D contract and offers it to pharmaceutical enterprises. An agency-theoretic model is employed to explore the contract whose terms are an upfront grant as a fixed fee and a sales tax credit as an incentive tool, examining how the values of related parameters affect contract term determinations. We found that the adaptability factor derived from urgent policies such as emergency use authorization (EUA) as well as tax credits, can be utilized as practical incentive tools that lead vaccine developers to increase their effort levels for R&D success. We also found that public-private state-emergency contracts may not follow the conventional wisdom. Counterintuitively, dependency on tax credits (incentive part) decrease as the client's degree of risk averseness increases in the emergency contract.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.