ArticleHealth policy and planning2023
Understanding reasons for and strategic responses to administrative health data misreporting in an Indian state.
Article in Health policy and planning, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 9 citations in OpenAlex.
- Coverage and distributional benefit-cost of rotavirus vaccine in Uganda: an analysis of routine health facility aggregated data.Cost effectiveness and resource allocation : C/E · 2024Article
- Stronger Evaluations are Needed for Interventions to Improve Health Worker Performance.The American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene · 2024Article
- Contributing factors for reduction in maternal mortality ratio in India.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- Barriers and benefits of mHealth for community health workers in integrated community case management of childhood diseases in Banda Parish, Kampala, Uganda: a cross-sectional study.BMC primary care · 2024Article
- Implementation of PM-JAY in India: a qualitative study exploring the role of competency, organizational and leadership drivers shaping early roll-out of publicly funded health insurance in three Indian states.Health research policy and systems · 2023Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
Abstract
The misreporting of administrative health data creates an inequitable distribution of scarce health resources and weakens transparency and accountability within health systems. In the mid-2010s, an Indian state introduced a district ranking system to monitor the monthly performance of health programmes alongside a set of data quality initiatives. However, questions remain about the role of data manipulation in compromising the accuracy of data available for decision-making. We used qualitative approaches to examine the opportunities, pressures and rationalization of potential data manipulation. Using purposive sampling, we interviewed 48 district-level respondents from high-, middle- and low-ranked districts and 35 division- and state-level officials, all of whom had data-related or programme monitoring responsibilities. Additionally, we observed 14 district-level meetings where administrative data were reviewed. District respondents reported that the quality of administrative data was sometimes compromised to achieve top district rankings. The pressure to exaggerate progress was a symptom of the broader system for assessing health performance that was often viewed as punitive and where district- and state-level superiors were viewed as having limited ability to ensure accountability for data quality. However, district respondents described being held accountable for results despite lacking the adequate capacity to deliver on them. Many rationalized data manipulation to cope with high pressures, to safeguard their jobs and, in some cases, for personal financial gain. Moreover, because data manipulation was viewed as a socially acceptable practice, ethical arguments against it were less effective. Potential entry points to mitigate data manipulation include (1) changing the incentive structures to place equal emphasis on the quality of data informing the performance data (e.g. district rankings), (2) strengthening checks and balances to reinforce the integrity of data-related processes within districts and (3) implementing policies to make data manipulation an unacceptable anomaly rather than a norm.
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Registered trials
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