Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35890875›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2022

Defending against Reconstruction Attacks through Differentially Private Federated Learning for Classification of Heterogeneous Chest X-ray Data.

Joceline Ziegler, Bjarne Pfitzner, Heinrich Schulz, Axel Saalbach, Bert Arnrich

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
3.0field-weighted citation impact, top 8% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed, 22 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Medical Imaging Applications of Federated Learning.Diagnostics (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023
    Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Joceline ZieglerDigital Engineering Faculty, University of Potsdam, 14482 Potsdam, Germany.ORCID 0000-0003-1659-7350
Bjarne PfitznerDigital Engineering Faculty, University of Potsdam, 14482 Potsdam, Germany.ORCID 0000-0001-7824-8872
Heinrich SchulzPhilips Research, 22335 Hamburg, Germany.ORCID 0000-0003-4048-2254
Axel SaalbachPhilips Research, 22335 Hamburg, Germany.ORCID 0000-0002-1535-2100
Bert ArnrichDigital Engineering Faculty, University of Potsdam, 14482 Potsdam, Germany.ORCID 0000-0001-8380-7667
Hasso Plattner Institute · DEPhilips (Germany) · DE

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Privacy regulations and the physical distribution of heterogeneous data are often primary concerns for the development of deep learning models in a medical context. This paper evaluates the feasibility of differentially private federated learning for chest X-ray classification as a defense against data privacy attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to directly compare the impact of differentially private training on two different neural network architectures, DenseNet121 and ResNet50. Extending the federated learning environments previously analyzed in terms of privacy, we simulated a heterogeneous and imbalanced federated setting by distributing images from the public CheXpert and Mendeley chest X-ray datasets unevenly among 36 clients. Both non-private baseline models achieved an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.94 on the binary classification task of detecting the presence of a medical finding. We demonstrate that both model architectures are vulnerable to privacy violation by applying image reconstruction attacks to local model updates from individual clients. The attack was particularly successful during later training stages. To mitigate the risk of a privacy breach, we integrated Rényi differential privacy with a Gaussian noise mechanism into local model training. We evaluate model performance and attack vulnerability for privacy budgets ε∈{1,3,6,10}. The DenseNet121 achieved the best utility-privacy trade-off with an AUC of 0.94 for ε=6. Model performance deteriorated slightly for individual clients compared to the non-private baseline. The ResNet50 only reached an AUC of 0.76 in the same privacy setting. Its performance was inferior to that of the DenseNet121 for all considered privacy constraints, suggesting that the DenseNet121 architecture is more robust to differentially private training.

Indexed as

Neural Networks, ComputerPrivacyHumansRadiographyROC CurveX-Raysfederated learningprivacy and securityprivacy attackX-ray

Identifiers

PMID35890875
PMCPMC9320045
OpenAlexW4285095301

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.