ArticleCognitive research: principles and implications2022
Framing cognitive offloading in terms of gains or losses: achieving a more optimal use of reminders.
Article in Cognitive research: principles and implications, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Get the unbalance right: asymmetric transfer effects in cognitive offloading.Cognitive research: principles and implications · 2026Article
- Metacognitive training facilitates optimal cognitive offloading.Cognitive research: principles and implications · 2026Article
- Borrowed or kept? How self-generation-first and direct-adoption AI workflows shape immediate unaided reasoning.Frontiers in psychology · 2026Article
- Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'.Psychonomic bulletin & review · 2023Review
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Authors and funding
6 authors.
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Abstract
Nowadays individuals can readily set reminders to offload intentions onto external resources, such as smartphone alerts, rather than using internal memory. Individuals tend to be biased, setting more reminders than would be optimal. We address the question whether the reminder bias depends on offloading scenarios being framed as either gains or losses, both between-participants (Experiment 1) and within-participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, framing of reminders in terms of gains resulted in participants employing a risk-averse strategy and using more reminders than would be optimal. Importantly, however, participants used reminders more optimally and were more willing to choose the risk-seeking option of remembering internally when reminders implied a loss. Based on metacognitive measures in Experiment 2, the reminder bias increased the more underconfident participants were about their memory abilities in both framing scenarios. Framing did not alter this relationship between erroneous metacognitive underconfidence and reminder bias but provides an additional influence. We conclude that emphasizing the losses (costs) associated with external reminders helps in achieving more optimal decisions in offloading situations, and that in addition to cognitive effort and metacognitive judgments, framing needs to be considered in improving individuals' offloading behavior.
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