Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35712271›Full record

ReviewFrontiers in public health2022

Complementarity of International Instruments in the Field of Biosecurity.

Iris M Vennis, Maja Boskovic, Diederik A Bleijs, Saskia A Rutjes

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Frontiers in public health, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Biosafety and biosecurity challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2023
    Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Iris M VennisCentre for Infectious Disease Control, Laboratory for Zoonoses and Environmental Microbiology, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, Netherlands.
Maja BoskovicEnconet Consulting Ges.m.b.H., Vienna, Austria.
Diederik A BleijsBiosecurity Office, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, Netherlands.
Saskia A RutjesCentre for Infectious Disease Control, Laboratory for Zoonoses and Environmental Microbiology, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, Netherlands.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the devastating impact of infectious disease outbreaks and the threat of emerging and re-emerging dangerous pathogens, independent of their origin. Natural, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks all need systems in place for an effective public health response. The best known international instrument in the field of public health is the WHO International Health Regulations (2005). Although the International Health Regulations are mainly focused on natural disease outbreaks, the actions to take to comply with them also contribute to biosecurity and non-proliferation. This paper examines in case of full implementation of the International Health Regulations, what other actions states should take to comply with international biosecurity instruments, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, to effectively prevent and defend against intentional biological threats. An overview of international instruments from different disciplines regarding biosecurity is presented. Furthermore, this paper clarifies the similarities between the international biosecurity instruments and addresses the additional requirements that instruments stipulate. From a detailed comparison between the instruments it can be concluded that, to adhere to all legally-binding international biosecurity instruments, specific non-proliferation and export control measures are necessary in addition to full implementation of the International Health Regulations. Additionally, an overview of non-legally binding instruments in the field of biosecurity is presented and practical implementation examples are highlighted. Compliance with legally binding instruments can be improved by precise guidance provided by non-legally binding instruments that are clear and attuned to the situation on the ground. To improve understanding of the existing international instruments, this paper aims to provide an overview of the international legal biosecurity framework to biosecurity experts, policymakers, civil servants, and practitioners. It offers possible practical applications for the politico-legal context and accommodates the enhancement of full employment of biosecurity resources for an improved multidisciplinary capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.

Indexed as

COVID-19International CooperationBiosecurityHumansPandemicsPublic HealthbiosecurityBTWCglobal health securityhealth policyIHRinfectious diseaselegal instrumentsUNSCR1540

Identifiers

PMID35712271
PMCPMC9195852

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.