Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35700167›Full record

ArticlePLoS computational biology2022

Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces.

Laura Schmid, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A Nowak

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS computational biology, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Evolution of noisy learning in games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  2. Reply to Sacco: Complete spaces as outcomes of evolutionary optimization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024
    Article
  6. Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  7. Cooperation among unequal players with aspiration-driven learning.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024
    Article
  8. A geometric process of evolutionary game dynamics.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2023
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Laura SchmidIST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-6978-7329
Christian HilbeMax Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.ORCID 0000-0001-5116-955X
Krishnendu ChatterjeeIST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-4561-241X
Martin A NowakDepartment of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In repeated interactions, players can use strategies that respond to the outcome of previous rounds. Much of the existing literature on direct reciprocity assumes that all competing individuals use the same strategy space. Here, we study both learning and evolutionary dynamics of players that differ in the strategy space they explore. We focus on the infinitely repeated donation game and compare three natural strategy spaces: memory-1 strategies, which consider the last moves of both players, reactive strategies, which respond to the last move of the co-player, and unconditional strategies. These three strategy spaces differ in the memory capacity that is needed. We compute the long term average payoff that is achieved in a pairwise learning process. We find that smaller strategy spaces can dominate larger ones. For weak selection, unconditional players dominate both reactive and memory-1 players. For intermediate selection, reactive players dominate memory-1 players. Only for strong selection and low cost-to-benefit ratio, memory-1 players dominate the others. We observe that the supergame between strategy spaces can be a social dilemma: maximum payoff is achieved if both players explore a larger strategy space, but smaller strategy spaces dominate.

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionGame TheoryCooperative BehaviorHumansLearning

Identifiers

PMID35700167
PMCPMC9197081

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.