ArticleJournal of bioethical inquiry2022
Why Intellectual Disability is Not Mere Difference.
Article in Journal of bioethical inquiry, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed.
- Disability, Subject-Dependence, and the Bad-Difference View.Bioethics · 2025Article
- What Do 'Humans' Need? Sufficiency and Pluralism.Ethics, policy & environment · 2023Article
- Despair of the Intellect, but Hope of the Heart?Journal of bioethical inquiry · 2022Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall-any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes's Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad-by itself it makes a person worse off, apart from a non-accommodating environment; (2) universally bad-it lowers quality of life for every intellectually disabled person; and (3) globally bad-it reduces a person's overall well-being. While people with intellectual disabilities are functionally disadvantaged, this does not imply that they are morally inferior-lower quality of life does not mean lesser moral status. No clinical implications concerning disability-based selective abortion, denial of life-saving treatment, or rationing of scarce resources follow from the claim that intellectual disability is bad difference.
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What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.