Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35602854›Full record

ArticleThe quarterly journal of economics2015

BEHAVIORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE.

Katherine Baicker, Sendhil Mullainathan, Joshua Schwartzstein

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The quarterly journal of economics, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 37 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
37citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

37 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Trial
  2. "Is It Free?": Out-of-Pocket Costs for Annual Checkups Among the Insured.Prevention science : the official journal of the Society for Prevention Research · 2026
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. The cost-effectiveness of value-based insurance design initiatives in managing cardiometabolic diseases: a systematic review.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Review
  13. Price Sensitivity and Information Barriers to the Take-Up of Naloxone.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2024
    Article
  14. The Health Costs of Cost Sharing.The quarterly journal of economics · 2024
    Article
  15. Article
  16. What Can Economics Say about Alzheimer's Disease?Journal of economic literature · 2023
    Article
  17. Article
  18. Healthcare Rationing in Public Insurance Programs: Evidence from Medicaid.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2022
    Article
  19. Evaluating the Effect of San Francisco's Paid Parental Leave Ordinance on Birth Outcomes.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Katherine BaickerHarvard University.
Sendhil MullainathanHarvard University.
Joshua SchwartzsteinDartmouth College.

Funding

NBER Center for Aging and Health Research-Post COVID-19 Experiences Among Adults with ADRDP30AG012810 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI DAVID M CUTLER · 1999 to 2026
$24.6M
NBER Training Program in Aging and Health EconomicsT32AG000186 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI CUTLER, DAVID M, FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 1989 to 2024
$9.6M
NIA NIH HHS P30 AG012810NIA NIH HHS T32 AG000186
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

A fundamental implication of standard moral hazard models is overuse of low-value medical care because copays are lower than costs. In these models, the demand curve alone can be used to make welfare statements, a fact relied on by much empirical work. There is ample evidence, though, that people misuse care for a different reason: mistakes, or "behavioral hazard." Much high-value care is underused even when patient costs are low, and some useless care is bought even when patients face the full cost. In the presence of behavioral hazard, welfare calculations using only the demand curve can be off by orders of magnitude or even be the wrong sign. We derive optimal copay formulas that incorporate both moral and behavioral hazard, providing a theoretical foundation for value-based insurance design and a way to interpret behavioral "nudges." Once behavioral hazard is taken into account, health insurance can do more than just provide financial protection - it can also improve health care efficiency.

Identifiers

PMID35602854
PMCPMC9121790

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.