ArticleInternational journal of environmental research and public health2022
A Regulatory Game Analysis of Smart Aging Platforms Considering Privacy Protection.
Article in International journal of environmental research and public health, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed, 11 citations in OpenAlex.
- Digital inclusion, legal governance, and the adoption of smart care services by older adults in China: an evolutionary game analysis.Frontiers in public health · 2026Article
- The influence of older adults' digital health literacy on health information protection behavior: a moderated mediation model.Frontiers in public health · 2026Article
- Selection of dual-channel supply chain cooperation mode of older adults care service under the government subsidy strategy.PloS one · 2025Article
- Evolutionary Game Research on Green Construction Considering Consumers' Preference under Government Supervision.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
5 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Privacy and information protection are important issues in the era of big data. At present, China's elderly care industry is gradually adopting the supply model of smart elderly care to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand. However, the low level of regulation of smart aging platforms may lead to a low level of privacy protection on the platforms. Therefore, in this paper, based on the evolutionary game and Lyapunov theory, we discuss the willingness of elderly people to participate in regulation, the privacy protection status of platform service providers, and the degree of government regulation, as well as the key factors affecting the equilibrium of the three-party game system, and conduct simulation analysis and game system optimization using MATLAB. The simulation results show that A1(0,0,1) and A5(0,0,0) can be transformed to A8(1,1,0) by adjusting the parameters, i.e., the optimal ESS is participation, high-quality protection, and low investment supervision; the service income of the elderly, the loss of privacy leakage, the investment cost of service providers, and the amount of government rewards and punishments are the key factors affecting the tripartite game system. By analyzing the impact of factors, such as benefits and costs, on privacy protection and the regulation of smart senior care platforms, the level of privacy protection of smart senior care platforms can be improved and the process of the comprehensive regulation of domestic senior care services can be promoted.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.