Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35564370›Full record

ArticleInternational journal of environmental research and public health2022

Analysis on Recycling Channel Selection of Construction and Demolition Waste in China from the Perspective of Supply Chain.

Ruwen Tan, Xiang Qing, Jingsong Yang, Jing Zhang, Deng Li

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in International journal of environmental research and public health, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Research on the Governance Relationship among Stakeholders of Construction Waste Recycling Based on ANP-SNA.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Ruwen TanCollege of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.
Xiang QingCollege of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.
Jingsong YangCollege of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.
Jing ZhangCollege of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.
Deng LiCollege of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Although construction and demolition waste (C&D waste) recycling has been widely regarded as an effective way to save resources, its selection of recycling channels has received little attention. In order to improve the recycling efficiency of C&D waste and promote the process of C&D waste management, we innovatively propose a dual-channel recycling problem of C&D waste from the perspective of supply-chain operation, aiming to study the impact of the selection of recycling channels and the government's economic intervention on pricing decisions. Specifically, we build in this paper a three-echelon construction material supply chain including a construction contractor, a professional recycling agency, and a building materials manufacturer, considering two modes: the construction contractor does the recycling job alone (as the direct channel) and the construction contractor entrusts the recycling job to the professional recycling agency (as the indirect channel). We use game theory to analyze the optimal decision strategies of the members with or without governmental intervention and the equilibrium strategies are obtained. At the same time, taking Chongqing city as an example, we apply the model to carry out numerical simulation, and the results reveal that greater recycling costs of C&D waste leads to lower profits for the members. When the market capacity of first-class renewable building materials increases, the recycler's recycling cost of C&D waste decreases, and the remanufacturing cost of recycled materials processed into first-class renewable building materials decreases, the supply-chain members will choose the indirect channel to perform the recycling job. In the case when government intervention exists, the recycling quantity of C&D waste increases, the price of the final products decreases, and both the total profit of the system and the profit of the supply-chain members increase; there is a positive correlation with the government subsidies. The study provides some insights on managerial significance to C&D waste recycling management.

Indexed as

Construction IndustryWaste ManagementChinaConstruction MaterialsGame TheoryIndustrial WasteRecyclingIndustrial Wasteconstruction and demolition wastedual-channel recyclinggame theorygovernmental interventionsupply chain

Identifiers

PMID35564370
PMCPMC9100018

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.