Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35532831›Full record

ArticleMemory & cognition2022

Cognitive processes in imaginative moral shifts: How judgments of morally unacceptable actions change.

Beyza Tepe, Ruth M J Byrne

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Memory & cognition, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Inference and Imagination.Topics in cognitive science · 2026
    Review
  2. Imaginative Thought.Journal of cognition · 2026
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Moral judgements reflect default representations of possibility.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2022
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Beyza TepeDepartment of Psychology, Bahçeşehir University, Ciragan Cd., Osmanpasa Mektebi Sk. 4-6, 34349, Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey. beyza.tepe@eas.bau.edu.tr.ORCID 0000-0003-0246-4995
Ruth M J ByrneSchool of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College, Dublin, University of Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland.ORCID 0000-0003-2240-1211

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

How do people come to consider a morally unacceptable action, such as "a passenger in an airplane does not want to sit next to a Muslim passenger and so he tells the stewardess the passenger must be moved to another seat", to be less unacceptable? We propose they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives about how things could have been different that transform the unacceptable action to be less unacceptable. Five experiments identify the cognitive processes underlying this imaginative moral shift: an action is judged less unacceptable when people imagine circumstances in which it would have been moral. The effect occurs for immediate counterfactuals and reflective ones, but is greater when participants create an immediate counterfactual first, and diminished when they create a reflective one first. The effect also occurs for unreasonable actions. We discuss the implications for alternative theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes underlying moral judgments.

Indexed as

JudgmentMoralsHumansImaginationMaleCounterfactualsImaginationJudgmentsMorality

Identifiers

PMID35532831
PMCPMC9083480

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.