Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35522465›Full record

ArticleJMIR mHealth and uHealth2022

Privacy, Data Sharing, and Data Security Policies of Women's mHealth Apps: Scoping Review and Content Analysis.

Najd Alfawzan, Markus Christen, Giovanni Spitale, Nikola Biller-Andorno

Open access · goldAbstract readScoping Review
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in JMIR mHealth and uHealth, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 55 papers, 3 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
55citing papers in PubMed, 3 pooled it
35.3field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

55 citing papers in PubMed, 3 syntheses or guidelines pooled it, 130 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Najd AlfawzanInstitute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.ORCID 0000-0002-9949-5335
Markus ChristenInstitute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.ORCID 0000-0001-8378-9366
Giovanni SpitaleInstitute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.ORCID 0000-0002-6812-0979
Nikola Biller-AndornoInstitute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.ORCID 0000-0001-7661-1324
University of Zurich · CH

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundWomen's mobile health (mHealth) is a growing phenomenon in the mobile app global market. An increasing number of women worldwide use apps geared to female audiences (female technology). Given the often private and sensitive nature of the data collected by such apps, an ethical assessment from the perspective of data privacy, sharing, and security policies is warranted.

objectiveThe purpose of this scoping review and content analysis was to assess the privacy policies, data sharing, and security policies of women's mHealth apps on the current international market (the App Store on the Apple operating system [iOS] and Google Play on the Android system).

methodsWe reviewed the 23 most popular women's mHealth apps on the market by focusing on publicly available apps on the App Store and Google Play. The 23 downloaded apps were assessed manually by 2 independent reviewers against a variety of user data privacy, data sharing, and security assessment criteria.

resultsAll 23 apps collected personal health-related data. All apps allowed behavioral tracking, and 61% (14/23) of the apps allowed location tracking. Of the 23 apps, only 16 (70%) displayed a privacy policy, 12 (52%) requested consent from users, and 1 (4%) had a pseudoconsent. In addition, 13% (3/23) of the apps collected data before obtaining consent. Most apps (20/23, 87%) shared user data with third parties, and data sharing information could not be obtained for the 13% (3/23) remaining apps. Of the 23 apps, only 13 (57%) provided users with information on data security.

conclusionsMany of the most popular women's mHealth apps on the market have poor data privacy, sharing, and security standards. Although regulations exist, such as the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, current practices do not follow them. The failure of the assessed women's mHealth apps to meet basic data privacy, sharing, and security standards is not ethically or legally acceptable.

Indexed as

Mobile ApplicationsTelemedicineComputer SecurityFemaleHumansInformation DisseminationPolicyPrivacydata securitydata sharingdata transparencyethicsfemtechmHealthmobile appsmobile healthprivacyprivacy policywomen’s health

Identifiers

PMID35522465
PMCPMC9123546
OpenAlexW4213423749

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.