Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35490544›Full record

ArticleConsciousness and cognition2022

I overthink-Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder.

Anna Ciaunica, Anil Seth, Jakub Limanowski, Casper Hesp, Karl J Friston

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Consciousness and cognition, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 40 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
40citing papers in PubMed
327.3field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

40 citing papers in PubMed, 73 citations in OpenAlex.

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  15. Dissociative Symptoms and Interoceptive Integration.Current topics in behavioral neurosciences · 2025
    Review
  16. Review
  17. Article
  18. The Many Roles of Precision in Action.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024
    Review
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 5 institutions in 5 countries.

Anna CiaunicaCentre for Philosophy of Science, University of Lisbon, Campo Grande, 1749-016 Lisbon, Portugal; Institute of Philosophy, University of Porto, via Panoramica s/n 4150-564, Porto, Portugal; Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, WC1N 3AR London, UK. Electronic address: a.ciaunica@ucl.ac.uk.
Anil SethSackler Centre for Consciousness Science and School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, UK; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Jakub LimanowskiLifespan and Developmental Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology, Technical University Dresden, 01069 Dresden, Germany; Centre for Tactile Internet with Human-in-the-Loop CeTI - Cluster of Excellence, Technical University Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany.
Casper HespWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, WC1N 3AR London, UK; Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 147, 1012 GC Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Karl J FristonWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, WC1N 3AR London, UK.
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research · CATU Dresden · DEUniversidade do Porto · PTUniversity College London · GBWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging · GB

Funding

Wellcome TrustWellcome Trust 088130/Z/09/Z
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of 'predicting precision' and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that "I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception". We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that 'another agent' is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the 'other agent' is 'me' (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

Indexed as

DepersonalizationHumansSelf PsychologyActive inferenceAgencyDepersonalisationPredictive processingSense of selfSensory attenuation

Identifiers

PMID35490544
PMCPMC9130736
OpenAlexW4225152021

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.