ArticleJournal of the Royal Society, Interface2022
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions.
Article in Journal of the Royal Society, Interface, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.
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Who cites it
10 citing papers in PubMed.
- Evolutionary dynamics of trust in hierarchical populations with varying investment strategies.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2025Article
- Evolution of trust in theJournal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2025Article
- Investigating the impact of environmental feedback on the optional prisoner's dilemma for insights into cyclic dominance and evolution of cooperation.Royal Society open science · 2024Article
- Article
- Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Small bots, big impact: solving the conundrum of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma game through simple strategies.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2023Article
- Emerging solutions from the battle of defensive alliances.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Article
- Article
- Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2022Article
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4 authors.
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Abstract
Explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals from an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy and social sciences. Social exclusion is believed to be an answer to this conundrum. However, previously related studies often assume one-shot interactions and ignore how free-riding is identified, which seem to be too idealistic. In this work, we consider repeated interactions where excluders need to pay a monitoring cost to identify free-riders for exclusion and free-riders cannot participate in the following possible game interactions once they are identified and excluded by excluders in the repeated interaction process. We reveal that the introduction of such exclusion can prevent the breakdown of cooperation in repeated group interactions. In particular, we demonstrate that an evolutionary oscillation among cooperators, defectors and excluders can appear in infinitely large populations when early exclusion is implemented. In addition, we find that the population spends most of the time in states where cooperators dominate for early exclusion when stochastic mutation-selection is considered in finite populations. Our results highlight that early exclusion is successful in solving the mentioned enigma of cooperation in repeated group interactions.
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