Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35299848›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in public health2021

Moral Risk in the Behavior of Doctors of the Comprehensive Health Insurance in the Province of San Román, Puno-Peru, 2021.

Julio C Quispe Mamani, Yessica Quilca Soto, Dominga A Calcina Álvarez, Cristóbal R Yapuchura Saico, Nelly J Ulloa Gallardo, Santotomas L Aguilar Pinto, Betsy Quispe Quispe, Nelly B Quispe Maquera, Balbina E Cutipa Quilca

Abstract read
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in public health, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Julio C Quispe MamaniFaculty of Economic Engineering, National University of the Altiplano, Puno, Peru.
Yessica Quilca SotoFaculty of Health Sciences, Professional School of Dentistry, of the National University of the Altiplano, Puno, Peru.
Dominga A Calcina ÁlvarezFaculty of Education of the Amazonian National University of Madre de Dios, Puno, Peru.
Cristóbal R Yapuchura SaicoFaculty of Economic Engineering, National University of the Altiplano, Puno, Peru.
Nelly J Ulloa GallardoFaculty of Engineering, Systems Engineering and Informatics of the National Amazonian University of Madre De Dios, Puno, Peru.
Santotomas L Aguilar PintoFaculty of Administrative Sciences of the Andean University Néstor Cáceres Velásquez, Puno, Peru.
Betsy Quispe QuispeFaculty of Health Sciences, Professional School of Dentistry, of the National University of the Altiplano, Puno, Peru.
Nelly B Quispe MaqueraFaculty of Health Sciences, Professional School of Dentistry, of the National University of the Altiplano, Puno, Peru.
Balbina E Cutipa QuilcaFaculty of Accounting and Administrative Sciences, Professional School of Accounting Sciences, of the National University of the Altiplano, Puno, Peru.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Objective: The objective of the research was to determine which socioeconomic factors are the ones that most influence the moral hazard in the behavior of the doctors of the Comprehensive Health Insurance in the province of San Román and to identify the attitude of the doctor to a gift and its influence in moral hazard. Methods: The methodology used has a mixed, non-experimental and correlational approach, the Binomial Probit econometric model was used, applying a survey to 32 active doctors who work in the different SIS centers. Results: It is concluded that the factors that influenced the moral hazard and the behavior of the doctors were the bad reputation with a positive relation (27%), the social pressure with a negative relation (98%) and the behavioral attitude with a positive relation (94 %). Conclusion: Of the survey carried out, 40.6% of doctors reject the offer of a gift or bribe, reducing the influence of moral hazard by 94%.

Indexed as

Insurance, Major MedicalPhysiciansHumansMoralsPeruhealthhealth insurancemoral hazardphysician behaviorrisk

Identifiers

PMID35299848
PMCPMC8923345

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.