ArticleThe quarterly journal of economics2022
VOLUNTARY REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PAYMENT REFORM.
Article in The quarterly journal of economics, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. It is linked to trial NCT03407885 (The Impact of Medicare Bundled Payments), which is not on this map. Cited by 14 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
The Impact of Medicare Bundled Payments: Evidence From a Nationwide Randomized Evaluation for Lower Extremity Joint Replacement
Who cites it
14 citing papers in PubMed.
- Ex ante evaluation of risk adjustment models for prospective provider payment: a conceptual framework and empirical application.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026Article
- Provider payment incentives: Evidence from the U.S. hospice industry.Journal of public economics · 2025Article
- Factors Influencing Rural Hospitals' Decisions To Join An Alternative Payment Model: A Mixed-Methods Study.Health affairs (Project Hope) · 2025Article
- A Framework for the Design of Risk-Adjustment Models in Health care Provider Payment Systems.Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2025Review
- How Benchmark Changes Affect Participation in Accountable Care Organizations: Prospects for Voluntary Payment Models.American journal of health economics · 2025Article
- The spillover effects of Medicare's comprehensive care for joint replacement (CJR) model in California.PloS one · 2025Article
- Medicare's comprehensive care for joint replacement model increased public hospitals' inpatient length of stay.BMC health services research · 2024Article
- Hospital-Skilled Nursing Facility Integration and Participation in a Bundled Payment Initiative.JAMA network open · 2024Article
- Physician Group Practices Accrued Large Bonuses Under Medicare's Bundled Payment Model, 2018-20.Health affairs (Project Hope) · 2024Article
- Benchmarking Changes And Selective Participation In The Medicare Shared Savings Program.Health affairs (Project Hope) · 2023Article
- Review
- VOLUNTARY REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PAYMENT REFORM.The quarterly journal of economics · 2022Article
- Hospital Responses to Incentives in Episode-Based Payment for Joint Surgery: A Controlled Population-Based Study.JAMA internal medicine · 2021Article
- Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2020Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Government programs are often offered on an optional basis to market participants. We explore the economics of such voluntary regulation in the context of a Medicare payment reform, in which one medical provider receives a single, predetermined payment for a sequence of related healthcare services, instead of separate service-specific payments. This "bundled payment" program was originally implemented as a 5-year randomized trial, with mandatory participation by hospitals assigned to the new payment model; however, after two years, participation was made voluntary for half of these hospitals. Using detailed claim-level data, we document that voluntary participation is more likely for hospitals that can increase revenue without changing behavior ("selection on levels") and for hospitals that had large changes in behavior when participation was mandatory ("selection on slopes"). To assess outcomes under counterfactual regimes, we estimate a stylized model of responsiveness to and selection into the program. We find that the current voluntary regime generates inefficient transfers to hospitals, and that alternative (feasible) designs could reduce these inefficient transfers and raise welfare. Our analysis highlights key design elements to consider under voluntary regulation.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.