Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35171942›Full record

ArticlePloS one2022

Secondary attack rates in primary and secondary school bubbles following a confirmed case: Active, prospective national surveillance, November to December 2020, England.

Annabel A Powell, Georgina Ireland, Frances Baawuah, Joanne Beckmann, Ifeanyichukwu O Okike, Shazaad Ahmad, Joanna Garstang, Andrew J Brent, Bernadette Brent, Felicity Aiano and 20 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Measures implemented in the school setting to contain the COVID-19 pandemic.The Cochrane database of systematic reviews · 2024
    Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

30 authors.

Annabel A PowellUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Georgina IrelandUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Frances BaawuahUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Joanne BeckmannEast London NHS Foundation Trust, London, United Kingdom.
Ifeanyichukwu O OkikeUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Shazaad AhmadManchester University NHS Foundation Trust, Manchester, United Kingdom.
Joanna GarstangBirmingham Community Healthcare NHS Trust, Aston, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0001-9268-0581
Andrew J BrentNuffield Department of Medicine, Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Bernadette BrentNuffield Department of Medicine, Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Felicity AianoUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0002-0746-1075
James HargreavesFaculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.
Sinéad M LanganFaculty of Epidemiology and Population Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.
Punam MangtaniFaculty of Epidemiology and Population Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.
Patrick Nguipdop-DjomoFaculty of Epidemiology and Population Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.
Joanna SturgessFaculty of Epidemiology and Population Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.
William OswaldFaculty of Infectious and Tropical Diseases, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.
Katherine HallidayFaculty of Infectious and Tropical Diseases, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.
Emma RourkeOffice for National Statistics, Newport, United Kingdom.
Fiona DaweOffice for National Statistics, Newport, United Kingdom.
Zahin Amin-ChowdhuryUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Meaghan KallUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Maria ZambonUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
John PohUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Samreen IjazUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Angie LackenbyUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Joanna ElliUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Kevin E BrownUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Sir Ian DiamondOffice for National Statistics, Newport, United Kingdom.
Mary E RamsayUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.
Shamez N LadhaniUK Health Security Agency, London, United Kingdom.

Funding

Wellcome Trust 205039/Z/16/Z
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundFollowing the full re-opening of schools in England and emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant, we investigated the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection in students and staff who were contacts of a confirmed case in a school bubble (school groupings with limited interactions), along with their household members.

methodsPrimary and secondary school bubbles were recruited into sKIDsBUBBLE after being sent home to self-isolate following a confirmed case of COVID-19 in the bubble. Bubble participants and their household members were sent home-testing kits comprising nasal swabs for RT-PCR testing and whole genome sequencing, and oral fluid swabs for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies.

resultsDuring November-December 2020, 14 bubbles were recruited from 7 schools, including 269 bubble contacts (248 students, 21 staff) and 823 household contacts (524 adults, 299 children). The secondary attack rate was 10.0% (6/60) in primary and 3.9% (4/102) in secondary school students, compared to 6.3% (1/16) and 0% (0/1) among staff, respectively. The incidence rate for household contacts of primary school students was 6.6% (12/183) and 3.7% (1/27) for household contacts of primary school staff. In secondary schools, this was 3.5% (11/317) and 0% (0/1), respectively. Household contacts were more likely to test positive if their bubble contact tested positive although there were new infections among household contacts of uninfected bubble contacts.

interpretationCompared to other institutional settings, the overall risk of secondary infection in school bubbles and their household contacts was low. Our findings are important for developing evidence-based infection prevention guidelines for educational settings.

Indexed as

AdolescentAdultAntibodies, ViralChildContact TracingCOVID-19EnglandFemaleHumansIncidenceMaleNasopharynxProspective StudiesReverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain ReactionRNA, ViralSARS-CoV-2Antibodies, ViralRNA, Viral

Identifiers

PMID35171942
PMCPMC8849480

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.