Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35084348›Full record

ArticleJMIR mHealth and uHealth2022

Pulse Oximeter App Privacy Policies During COVID-19: Scoping Assessment.

Rachele Hendricks-Sturrup

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in JMIR mHealth and uHealth, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
0.3field-weighted citation impact, top 29% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 1 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author at 1 institution in 1 country.

Rachele Hendricks-Sturrup *Future of Privacy Forum, Washington, DC, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-3390-2583
Future of Privacy Forum · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundPulse oximeter apps became of interest to consumers during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly when traditional over-the-counter pulse oximeter devices were in short supply. Yet, no study to date has examined or scoped the state of privacy policies and notices for the top-rated and most downloaded pulse oximeter apps during COVID-19.

objectiveThe aim of this study was to examine, through a high-level qualitative assessment, the state and nature of privacy policies for the downloaded and top-rated pulse oximeter apps during the COVID-19 pandemic to (1) compare findings against comparable research involving other mobile health (mHealth) apps and (2) begin discussions on opportunities for future research or investigation.

methodsDuring August-October 2020, privacy policies were reviewed for pulse oximeter apps that had either at least 500 downloads (Google Play Store apps only) or a three out of five-star rating (Apple Store apps only). In addition to determining if the apps had an accessible privacy policy, other key privacy policy-related details that were extracted included, but were not limited to, app developer location (country); whether the app was free or required paid use/subscription; whether an ads disclosure was provided on the app's site; the scope of personal data collected; proportionality, fundamental rights, and data protection and privacy issues; and privacy safeguards.

resultsSix pulse oximeter apps met the inclusion criteria and only 33% (n=2) of the six apps had an accessible privacy policy that was specific to the pulse oximeter app feature (vs the app developer's website or at all). Variation was found in both the regulatory nature and data privacy protections offered by pulse oximeter apps, with notable privacy protection limitations and gaps, although each app provided at least some information about the scope of personal data collected upon installing the app.

conclusionsPulse oximeter app developers should invest in offering stronger privacy protections for their app users, and should provide more accessible and transparent privacy policies. This is a necessary first step to ensure that the data privacy of mHealth consumers is not exploited during public health emergency situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where over-the-counter personal health monitoring devices could be in short supply and patients and consumers may, as a result, turn to mHealth apps to fill such supply gaps. Future research considerations and recommendations are also suggested for mHealth technology and privacy researchers who are interested in examining privacy implications associated with the use of pulse oximeter apps during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.

Indexed as

COVID-19Mobile ApplicationsHumansPandemicsPolicyPrivacySARS-CoV-2COVID-19mHealthmobile appsprivacypulse oximeters

Identifiers

PMID35084348
PMCPMC8805452
OpenAlexW4206820657

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.