Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35083670›Full record

ArticleEnvironmental science and pollution research international2022

Transboundary watershed pollution control and product market competition with ecological compensation and emission tax: a dynamic analysis.

Yongxi Yi, Caini Ding, Chunyan Fu, Yuqiong Li

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Article in Environmental science and pollution research international, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
3.8field-weighted citation impact, top 6% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 14 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Yongxi YiSchool of Economics Management and Law, University of South China, Hengyang, China. yyx19999@126.com.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2479-4488
Caini DingSchool of Economics Management and Law, University of South China, Hengyang, China.
Chunyan FuSchool of Economics Management and Law, University of South China, Hengyang, China.
Yuqiong LiSchool of Economics Management and Law, University of South China, Hengyang, China.
University of South China · CN

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Product competition and pollution control are closely related to watershed environmental management, but existing literature rarely investigates them in an identical framework. Therefore, this paper develops a multiple differential game model to analyze product market competition and ecological compensation games between watershed regions based on the assumption that a region can choose four strategies to regulate its manufacturers while cooperating with other regions in the basin. Then, we solve the model and obtain a simultaneous equilibrium between the governments and manufacturers for the first time. The results show that the combination of emissions tax and ecological compensation results in the highest social welfare and water ecology for all regions in a basin. Furthermore, the ecological compensation rate independent of emissions tax policy and ecological compensation does not shift investment from downstream to upstream, but it can induce the upstream region to increase investment in management. In addition, if the governments impose an emissions tax, manufacturers' output in both regions decreases, and the upstream region is higher than in the downstream region.

Indexed as

GovernmentWater PollutionChinaEcological compensationMarket competitionPollution controlRiver basin

Identifiers

PMID35083670
OpenAlexW4220778390

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.