Evidence map›Paper›PMID 35000182›Full record

ArticleEnvironmental science and pollution research international2022

Cooperative green innovation.

Pu-Yan Nie, Hong-Xing Wen, Chan Wang

Abstract read
PubMed Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in Environmental science and pollution research international, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Mechanism of Enterprise Green Innovation Behavior Considering Coevolution Theory.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022
    Pooled it
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Pu-Yan NieSchool of Economics, Institute of Guangdong High-Quality Development, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics (GDUFE), Guangzhou, 510320, People's Republic of China.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6214-5980
Hong-Xing WenSchool of Economics, Institute of Guangdong High-Quality Development, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics (GDUFE), Guangzhou, 510320, People's Republic of China. pynie2013@163.com.
Chan WangSchool of Economics, Institute of Guangdong High-Quality Development, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics (GDUFE), Guangzhou, 510320, People's Republic of China. wangchan0512@163.com.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Cooperative green innovation is an important tool to cope with global climate change and this article highlights cooperative green innovation with game theory. Some interesting conclusions are achieved. First, emission tax stimulates the innovation for all firms. Second, free-rider phenomena appear in cooperative green innovation. When the cooperative green innovation requires big investment, firms have intention to launch free-rider. Finally, the underinvestment of cooperative green innovation exists. This article suggests to regulate innovative investment and to subsidize to improve cooperative green innovation.

Indexed as

Game TheoryInvestmentsCooperationEmission taxFree riderGreen innovation

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.