ArticleFrontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology2021
Overstatements and Understatements in the Debate on Synthetic Biology, Bioterrorism and Ethics.
Article in Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 6 citations in OpenAlex.
- The view of synthetic biology in the field of ethics: a thematic systematic review.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2024Pooled it
- The need for adaptability in detection, characterization, and attribution of biosecurity threats.Nature communications · 2024Review
- Safety risks and ethical governance of biomedical applications of synthetic biology.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2023Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
1 author at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Synthetic biology has many valuable applications, but it also gives rise to certain risks. In this paper I discuss the risk of bioterrorism, which often attracts attention in both the mass media and scientific debate, as well as in government reports. While some authors argue that there is a significant risk of bioterrorism connected to synthetic biology, other scholars claim that the risk is exaggerated and that actors often have motives for overstating the risk. In this paper, I argue that some estimates of the risk may be overstated but that certain risks of bioterrorism, such as the creation and spread of known pathogenic viruses, need to be taken seriously. Actors may also have scientific and financial motives for understating the risk. Such understatements are sometimes based on a principle of hope, which says that technological progress is important for the future welfare of humanity and that too much precaution would have bad consequences. I argue that this principle is problematic as the burdens and benefits of synthetic biology may not be equally divided between different social groups. Instead, I claim that the principle of precaution is more justified as a point of departure for assessing advancements within synthetic biology. It tells us that we need strong evidence that such advancements are safe, because there is a potential risk that they may make it easier for terrorist groups to create and spread known pathogenic viruses.
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Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.