ArticlePublic health nutrition2022
Electoral campaign contributions: an obstacle to sugary drink industry regulation in Brazil?
Article in Public health nutrition, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
- Sugary drinks taxation: industry's lobbying strategies, practices and arguments in the Brazilian Legislature.Public health nutrition · 2022Article
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
objectiveTo assess corporate electoral campaign contributions from industries related to sugary drinks production and the characteristics of the elected officials financed by the sector.
designCross-sectional analysis of electoral campaign contributions from corporations related to sugary drinks production (sugary drink industries and sugary drink input industries) to candidates to the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil.
settingElections to the 55
participantsCandidates to the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil.
resultsForty-nine companies or corporate groups that produce sugary drinks and fifty-two corporations that produce inputs for sugary drinks manufacturing contributed to electoral campaigns of candidates in the 2014 Election. Contributions from this industry sector represented 7·3 % of all corporate contributions and helped finance 11·7 % of the candidates and 46·2 % of the elected officials. The transnationals Ambev and Coca-Cola were the first and second biggest donors, respectively. Revenues mediated by political parties, from sugary drink industries and from corporate members of some industry associations (Abir, Unica and CitrusBR), were more prevalent. Among elected officials, a significant association was found between being financed by the sector and representing the south-east region, having higher education level and referring themselves as being professional politicians. In the multivariate model, financed candidates were 27 % more likely to be elected.
conclusionsCorporations related to sugary drinks production have contributed to the electoral campaigns of almost half of the Federal Deputies in Brazil in 2014. This possibly facilitates access to decision-makers and could help buy influence on legislative proposals, including health-related food policies.
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Registered trials
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