Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34843452›Full record

ArticlePLoS computational biology2021

A confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference.

Richard D Lange, Ankani Chattoraj, Jeffrey M Beck, Jacob L Yates, Ralf M Haefner

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS computational biology, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 27 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
27citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

27 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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  9. Bayesian inference by visuomotor neurons in the prefrontal cortex.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  10. Article
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  12. Bayesian inference by visuomotor neurons in prefrontal cortex.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2024
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  16. Review
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Richard D LangeBrain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, United States of America.
Ankani ChattorajBrain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-7644-667X
Jeffrey M BeckDepartment of Neurobiology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, United States of America.
Jacob L YatesBrain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0001-8322-5982
Ralf M HaefnerBrain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-5031-0379

Funding

VISUAL SCIENCET32EY007125 · NEI · UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER · PI Krystel R Huxlin, Duje Tadin · 1990 to 2026
$7.1M
CRCNS: The neural basis of probabilistic inference in the visual systemR01EY028811 · NEI · UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER · PI HAEFNER, RALF MANFRED · 2017 to 2021
$1.6M
NEI NIH HHS R01 EY028811NEI NIH HHS T32 EY007125
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Making good decisions requires updating beliefs according to new evidence. This is a dynamical process that is prone to biases: in some cases, beliefs become entrenched and resistant to new evidence (leading to primacy effects), while in other cases, beliefs fade over time and rely primarily on later evidence (leading to recency effects). How and why either type of bias dominates in a given context is an important open question. Here, we study this question in classic perceptual decision-making tasks, where, puzzlingly, previous empirical studies differ in the kinds of biases they observe, ranging from primacy to recency, despite seemingly equivalent tasks. We present a new model, based on hierarchical approximate inference and derived from normative principles, that not only explains both primacy and recency effects in existing studies, but also predicts how the type of bias should depend on the statistics of stimuli in a given task. We verify this prediction in a novel visual discrimination task with human observers, finding that each observer's temporal bias changed as the result of changing the key stimulus statistics identified by our model. The key dynamic that leads to a primacy bias in our model is an overweighting of new sensory information that agrees with the observer's existing belief-a type of 'confirmation bias'. By fitting an extended drift-diffusion model to our data we rule out an alternative explanation for primacy effects due to bounded integration. Taken together, our results resolve a major discrepancy among existing perceptual decision-making studies, and suggest that a key source of bias in human decision-making is approximate hierarchical inference.

Indexed as

BiasDecision MakingPerceptionHumansModels, Psychological

Identifiers

PMID34843452
PMCPMC8659691

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.