Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34753350›Full record

ArticleProceedings. Biological sciences2021

Decoupling cooperation and punishment in humans shows that punishment is not an altruistic trait.

Maxwell N Burton-Chellew, Claire Guérin

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings. Biological sciences, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Beyond a binary theorizing of prosociality.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Rethinking Norm Psychology.Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science · 2024
    Article
  4. The restart effect in social dilemmas shows humans are self-interested not altruistic.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2022
    Article
  5. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Maxwell N Burton-ChellewDepartment of Economics, HEC-University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.ORCID 0000-0002-5330-0379
Claire GuérinDepartment of Ecology and Evolution, Biophore, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.ORCID 0000-0001-7266-1631

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Economic experiments have suggested that cooperative humans will altruistically match local levels of cooperation (conditional cooperation) and pay to punish non-cooperators (altruistic punishment). Evolutionary models have suggested that if altruists punish non-altruists this could favour the evolution of costly helping behaviours (cooperation) among strangers. An often-key requirement is that helping behaviours and punishing behaviours form one single conjoined trait (strong reciprocity). Previous economics experiments have provided support for the hypothesis that punishment and cooperation form one conjoined, altruistically motivated, trait. However, such a conjoined trait may be evolutionarily unstable, and previous experiments have confounded a fear of being punished with being surrounded by cooperators, two factors that could favour cooperation. Here, we experimentally decouple the fear of punishment from a cooperative environment and allow cooperation and punishment behaviour to freely separate (420 participants). We show, that if a minority of individuals is made immune to punishment, they (i) learn to stop cooperating on average despite being surrounded by high levels of cooperation, contradicting the idea of conditional cooperation and (ii) often continue to punish, 'hypocritically', showing that cooperation and punishment do not form one, altruistically motivated, linked trait.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryPunishmentAltruismBiological EvolutionHumansconditional cooperationconfused learnersnorm enforcementpublic goods gamesocial preferencesstrong reciprocity

Identifiers

PMID34753350
PMCPMC8580421

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.