Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34725041›Full record

ArticleBMJ global health2021

Impact of zero-mark-up medicines policy on hospital revenue structure: a panel data analysis of 136 public tertiary hospitals in China, 2012-2020.

Hanchao Cheng, Yuou Zhang, Jing Sun, Yuanli Liu

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Article in BMJ global health, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
15citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

15 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Hanchao ChengSchool of Health Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences & Peking Union Medical College, Beijing, China.
Yuou ZhangSchool of Health Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences & Peking Union Medical College, Beijing, China.
Jing SunSchool of Health Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences & Peking Union Medical College, Beijing, China sunjing@sph.pumc.edu.cn.ORCID 0000-0002-4646-1174
Yuanli LiuSchool of Health Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences & Peking Union Medical College, Beijing, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveTo quantify the overall and dynamic effects of the implementation of the zero-mark-up medicines policy on the proportionate revenue generated from medicines, medical services and government subsidies at Chinese tertiary public hospitals.

methodsThe revenue data of 136 tertiary public hospitals from 2012 to 2020 and the implementation-time framework of zero-mark-up medicines policy of these hospitals were obtained from the institutional survey of the third-party evaluation of the China Healthcare Improvement Initiative. The study adopted the time-varying difference-in-differences method and combined it with the event study approach to estimate the effects of the zero-mark-up medicines policy.

resultsFollowing the implementation of the policy, the proportionate medicines revenue decreased by 3.23% (p<0.001); the proportionate medical services revenue increased by 3.48% (p=0.001); and the difference in the proportionate government subsidies revenue was not significant. In the year of implementation, the proportion of revenue generated from medicines decreased by 7.76% (p=0.0148); and that from medical services increased by 8.62% (p=0.0167). The effect of the policy gradually strengthened thereafter. In 2020, the sixth year after some hospitals started the implementation of the policy, the share of revenue generated from medicines decreased the most by 18.43% (p=0.0151), and that generated from medical services increased the most by 15.29% (p=0.0219). The share of revenue generated from government subsidies increased by 2%-5% in the second, third, fifth and sixth years following implementation (p<0.05).

conclusionsAlthough the policy goal of adjusting hospital revenue structure has been achieved, the findings were insufficient to conclude whether the policy goal of establishing a scientific compensation mechanism was met by increasing the price of medical services and government input. Additionally, whether there was an unexpected policy effect requires further analysis.

Indexed as

Drug CostsHealth Care ReformChinaData AnalysisHumansTertiary Care Centershealth economicshealth policyhealth services researchhealth systemshospital-based study

Identifiers

PMID34725041
PMCPMC8562510

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.