ArticleJournal for general philosophy of science = Zeitschrift fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie2021
Should We Strive to Make Science Bias-Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis.
Article in Journal for general philosophy of science = Zeitschrift fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed.
- Is any research ever truly bias-free? The myth of objectivity in science.Naunyn-Schmiedeberg's archives of pharmacology · 2026Review
- Improvement of bioanalytical parameters through automation: suitability of a hand-like robotic system.Analytical and bioanalytical chemistry · 2024Article
- Epistemic Functions of Replicability in Experimental Sciences: Defending the Orthodox View.Foundations of science · 2024Article
- Reproducibility and Scientific Integrity of Big Data Research in Urban Public Health and Digital Epidemiology: A Call to Action.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2023Article
- Rebuttal to Douglas and Elliott.Journal for general philosophy of science = Zeitschrift fur allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie · 2022Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Recently, many scientists have become concerned about an excessive number of failures to reproduce statistically significant effects. The situation has become dire enough that the situation has been named the 'reproducibility crisis'. After reviewing the relevant literature to confirm the observation that scientists do indeed view replication as currently problematic, I explain in philosophical terms why the replication of empirical phenomena, such as statistically significant effects, is important for scientific progress. Following that explanation, I examine various diagnoses of the reproducibility crisis, and argue that for the majority of scientists the crisis is due, at least in part, to a form of publication bias. This conclusion sets the stage for an assessment of the view that evidential relations in science are inherently value-laden, a view championed by Heather Douglas and Kevin Elliott. I argue, in response to Douglas and Elliott, and as motivated by the meta-scientific resistance scientists harbour to a publication bias, that if we advocate the value-ladenness of science the result would be a deepening of the reproducibility crisis.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.