ArticleNeuroscience of consciousness2021
Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity.
Article in Neuroscience of consciousness, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 29 papers.
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Who cites it
29 citing papers in PubMed.
- Towards a Mathematical Structure of Global Phenomenal Consciousness.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2026Article
- Fetal Pain Perception:Annals of the Child Neurology Society · 2026Review
- We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2026Article
- Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2026Article
- Beyond computational equivalence: the behavioral inference principle for machine consciousness.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2026Review
- Why does time feel the way it does? Toward a principled account of temporal experience.iScience · 2025Article
- Evidence of quantum-entangled higher states of consciousness.Computational and structural biotechnology journal · 2025Article
- Decrease and recovery of integrated information Φ during anesthesia and sleep on human functional magnetic resonance imaging.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2025Article
- Mathematical proof of the Fisher-EscolàComputational and structural biotechnology journal · 2025Article
- Beyond accommodation: on the structural turn in computational functionalist theories of consciousness.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2025Article
- Study protocol: Cerebral characterization of sensory gating in disconnected dreaming states during propofol anesthesia using fMRI.Frontiers in neuroscience · 2024Article
- How to be an integrated information theorist without losing your body.Frontiers in computational neuroscience · 2024Article
- Only consciousness truly exists? Two problems for IIT 4.0's ontology.Frontiers in psychology · 2024Article
- (Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictions: towards a Lakatosian consciousness science.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2024Article
- The Consciousness of Neuroscience.eNeuro · 2023Article
- The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0's Realist Idealism.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023Article
- Phi fluctuates with surprisal: An empirical pre-study for the synthesis of the free energy principle and integrated information theory.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions.Frontiers in psychology · 2023Article
- The necessary and sufficient mechanism of consciousness in a layered mind.Frontiers in psychology · 2023Article
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10 authors.
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Abstract
Objective correlates-behavioral, functional, and neural-provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the 'fallacy of misplaced objectivity': the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically-its subjective properties-not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
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