Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34603134›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in psychology2021

Stakes of Knowing the Truth: A Motivational Perspective on the Popularity of a Controversial Scientific Theory.

Tiffany Morisseau, T Y Branch, Gloria Origgi

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Review
  3. Revue du rhumatisme (Ed. francaise : 1993) · 2022
    Review
  4. Fake news: Why do we believe it?Joint bone spine · 2022
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Tiffany MorisseauLaboratoire de Psychologie Appliquée et d'ergonomie, Institut de Psychologie, Université Paris Descartes, Boulogne-Billancourt, France.
T Y BranchInstitut Jean Nicod, ENS, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France.
Gloria OriggiInstitut Jean Nicod, ENS, PSL University, CNRS, Paris, France.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The aim of this article is to provide a different perspective on people's beliefs regarding controversial scientific information. We emphasize that, although people generally aim at getting a fair representation of reality, accuracy about scientific issues only matters to the extent that individuals perceive it as useful to achieve their own goals. This has important consequences in terms of how anti-science attitudes as well as epistemically questionable beliefs must be interpreted, which has consequences for addressing misinformation. We argue that most people who endorse scientific misinformation are not truly interested in its accuracy, and rather that plausibility at face value often suffices when it is meant to be used for social purposes only. We illustrate this view with the example of hydroxychloroquine, which was considered as potential treatment for Covid-19, and which has been the subject of much media hype and public concern, particularly in France.

Indexed as

anti-science attitudesbeliefs about sciencecognitive accuracyCovid-19didier raoulthydroxychloroquinemotivated reasoningsocial cognition

Identifiers

PMID34603134
PMCPMC8485728

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.