ArticlePhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2021
When does reputation lie? Dynamic feedbacks between costly signals, social capital and social prominence.
Article in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.
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Who cites it
9 citing papers in PubMed.
- Third-party arbitration and forgiving strategies increase cooperation when perception errors are common.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Article
- The interdependence of relational and material wealth inequality in Pemba, Zanzibar.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation : Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure.Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) · 2022Article
- Social hierarchies and social networks in humans.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2022Article
- The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Performing a dramatic act of religious devotion, creating an art exhibit, or releasing a new product are all examples of public acts that signal quality and contribute to building a reputation. Signalling theory predicts that these public displays can reliably reveal quality. However, data from ethnographic work in South India suggests that more prominent individuals gain more from reputation-building religious acts than more marginalized individuals. To understand this phenomenon, we extend signalling theory to include variation in people's social prominence or social capital, first with an analytical model and then with an agent-based model. We consider two ways in which social prominence/capital may alter signalling: (i) it impacts observers' priors, and (ii) it alters the signallers' pay-offs. These two mechanisms can result in both a 'reputational shield,' where low quality individuals are able to 'pass' as high quality thanks to their greater social prominence/capital, and a 'reputational poverty trap,' where high quality individuals are unable to improve their standing owing to a lack of social prominence/capital. These findings bridge the signalling theory tradition prominent in behavioural ecology, anthropology and economics with the work on status hierarchies in sociology, and shed light on the complex ways in which individuals make inferences about others. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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