Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34601918›Full record

ArticlePhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2021

The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling.

S Számadó, D Balliet, F Giardini, E A Power, K Takács

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
15citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

15 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Cooperation in the Time of COVID.Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science · 2024
    Review
  6. Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

S SzámadóDepartment of Sociology and Communication, BUTE, Budapest, Hungary.ORCID 0000-0003-2204-9705
D BallietDepartment of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.ORCID 0000-0001-5365-9675
F GiardiniDepartment of Sociology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.ORCID 0000-0001-7512-0048
E A PowerDepartment of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-3064-2050
K TakácsCSS-RECENS, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary.ORCID 0000-0001-9126-3233

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. There is overwhelming empirical evidence from different disciplines that reputation and gossip promote cooperation in humans in different contexts. Despite decades of research, important details of reputation systems are still unclear. Our goal with this theme issue is to promote an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and understand the evolution and maintenance of reputation systems with a special emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The theme issue is organized around four main questions: What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? What is the content and context of reputation systems? How can reputations promote cooperation? And, what is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation? This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Indexed as

CommunicationCooperative BehaviorHumansLanguagecooperationgossiphonest signallingreputation

Identifiers

PMID34601918
PMCPMC8487738

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.