ArticlePhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2021
Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence.
Article in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 17 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
17 citing papers in PubMed.
- Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment signaling for cooperative assortment.iScience · 2026Article
- Partner choice increases observed reciprocity-based cooperation but decreases unobserved stake-based cooperation.Royal Society open science · 2025Article
- Gratitude enhances widespread dynamic cooperation and inter-brain synchronization in females.Social cognitive and affective neuroscience · 2025Article
- Estimated costs and benefits of participation in an extreme ritual in Mauritius.Evolutionary human sciences · 2025Article
- The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Women's subsistence networks scaffold cultural transmission among BaYaka foragers in the Congo Basin.Science advances · 2024Article
- Article
- Drivers of Dyadic Cofeeding Tolerance inBiology · 2022Article
- Cooperation as a signal of time preferences.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2022Article
- Evolution of cooperation with joint liability.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2022Article
- Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2022Article
- Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.