ArticlePhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2021
Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding.
Article in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
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Who cites it
11 citing papers in PubMed, 19 citations in OpenAlex.
- Ethics trumps resources in women's and men's evaluations of potential mates and competitors.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- Cooperation is not rewarded by friendship, but generous and selfish students repel each other in social networks.PloS one · 2025Article
- Clustering drives cooperation on reputation networks, all else fixed.Royal Society open science · 2023Article
- Do you reap what you sow? Driving mechanism of supply chain transparency on consumers' indirect reciprocity.Frontiers in psychology · 2023Article
- Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Review
- The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Review
- Gossip and reputation in everyday life.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors at 1 institution in 5 countries.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals had confidence in gossip in both conditions, we found that, overall, neither the opportunities for cross-checking nor bonding were able to maintain cooperation. Meanwhile, strong competition for reputation increased cooperation when individuals' payoffs depended greatly on their position relative to their rivals. Our results suggest that intense competition for reputation facilitates gossip functioning as an informal device promoting cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.