Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34583977›Full record

Observational studyBMJ quality & safety2022

Examining organisational responses to performance-based financial incentive systems: a case study using NHS staff influenza vaccination rates from 2012/2013 to 2019/2020.

Adiba Liaqat, Suzy Gallier, Katharine Reeves, Hannah Crothers, Felicity Evison, Kelly Schmidtke, Paul Bird, Samuel I Watson, Kamlesh Khunti, Richard Lilford

Abstract readObservational Study
In one paragraph

Observational study in BMJ quality & safety, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Observational
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

Adiba LiaqatHealth Informatics, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK.
Suzy GallierHealth Informatics, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-1026-4125
Katharine ReevesHealth Informatics, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK.
Hannah CrothersHealth Informatics, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK hannah.crothers@uhb.nhs.uk.ORCID 0000-0001-5738-4111
Felicity EvisonHealth Informatics, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK.
Kelly SchmidtkeWarwick Medical School, University of Warwick, Coventry, Coventry, UK.
Paul BirdInstitute for Translational Medicine, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK.
Samuel I WatsonInstitute of Applied Health Research, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-8972-769X
Kamlesh KhuntiDiabetes Research Centre, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK.
Richard LilfordInstitute of Applied Health Research, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-0634-984X

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveFinancial incentives are often applied to motivate desirable performance across organisations in healthcare systems. In the 2016/2017 financial year, the National Health Service (NHS) in England set a national performance-based incentive to increase uptake of the influenza vaccination among frontline staff. Since then, the threshold levels needed for hospital trusts to achieve the incentive (ie, the targets) have ranged from 70% to 80%. The present study examines the impact of this financial incentive across eight vaccination seasons.

designA retrospective observational study examining routinely recorded rates of influenza vaccination among staff in all acute NHS hospital trusts across eight vaccination seasons (2012/2013-2019/2020). The number of trusts included varied per year, from 127 to 137, due to organisational changes. McCrary's density test is conducted to determine if the number of hospital trusts narrowly achieving the target by the end of each season is higher than would be expected in the absence of any responsiveness to the target. We refer to this bunching above the target threshold as a 'threshold effect'.

resultsIn the years before a national incentive was set, 9%-31% of NHS Trusts reported achieving the target, compared with 43%-74% in the 4 years after. Threshold effects did not emerge before the national incentive for payment was set; however, since then, threshold effects have appeared every year. Some trusts report narrowly achieving the target each year, both as the target rises and falls. Threshold effects were not apparent at targets for partial payments.

conclusionsWe provide compelling evidence that performance-based financial incentives produced threshold effects. Policymakers who set such incentives are encouraged to track threshold effects since they contain information on how organisations are responding to an incentive, what enquiries they may wish to make, how the incentive may be improved and what unintended effects it may be having.

Indexed as

Influenza, HumanState MedicineHumansMotivationOrganizational InnovationReimbursement, IncentiveVaccinationfinancial incentiveshealthcare quality improvementperformance measures

Identifiers

PMID34583977
PMCPMC9411890

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.