Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34577432›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2021

Cybersecurity in Power Grids: Challenges and Opportunities.

Tim Krause, Raphael Ernst, Benedikt Klaer, Immanuel Hacker, Martin Henze

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Security Baseline for Substation Automation Systems.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023
    Article
  5. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Tim KrauseCyber Analysis & Defense, Fraunhofer FKIE, 53343 Wachtberg, Germany.
Raphael ErnstCyber Analysis & Defense, Fraunhofer FKIE, 53343 Wachtberg, Germany.
Benedikt KlaerDigital Energy, Fraunhofer FIT, 52056 Aachen, Germany.
Immanuel HackerDigital Energy, Fraunhofer FIT, 52056 Aachen, Germany.ORCID 0000-0002-5860-8460
Martin HenzeCyber Analysis & Defense, Fraunhofer FKIE, 53343 Wachtberg, Germany.ORCID 0000-0001-8717-2523

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Increasing volatilities within power transmission and distribution force power grid operators to amplify their use of communication infrastructure to monitor and control their grid. The resulting increase in communication creates a larger attack surface for malicious actors. Indeed, cyber attacks on power grids have already succeeded in causing temporary, large-scale blackouts in the recent past. In this paper, we analyze the communication infrastructure of power grids to derive resulting fundamental challenges of power grids with respect to cybersecurity. Based on these challenges, we identify a broad set of resulting attack vectors and attack scenarios that threaten the security of power grids. To address these challenges, we propose to rely on a defense-in-depth strategy, which encompasses measures for (i) device and application security, (ii) network security, and (iii) physical security, as well as (iv) policies, procedures, and awareness. For each of these categories, we distill and discuss a comprehensive set of state-of-the art approaches, as well as identify further opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity in interconnected power grids.

Indexed as

critical infrastructurecyber-physical securitycybersecuritypower gridpower system communication

Identifiers

PMID34577432
PMCPMC8473297

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.