Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34546949›Full record

ArticleAnnals of family medicine

Financial Incentives for Medical Assistants: A Mixed-Methods Exploration of Bonus Structures, Motivation, and Population Health Quality Measures.

Stacie Vilendrer, Cati Brown-Johnson, Samantha M R Kling, Darlene Veruttipong, Alexis Amano, Bryan Bohman, William P Daines, David Overton, Raj Srivastava, Steven M Asch

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Annals of family medicine. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

Stacie VilendrerDivision of Primary Care and Population Health, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California staciev@stanford.edu.
Cati Brown-JohnsonDivision of Primary Care and Population Health, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California.
Samantha M R KlingDivision of Primary Care and Population Health, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California.
Darlene VeruttipongDivision of Primary Care and Population Health, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California.
Alexis AmanoDivision of Primary Care and Population Health, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California.
Bryan BohmanDepartment of Anesthesiology Perioperative and Pain Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California.
William P DainesInternal Medicine Clinical Program, Intermountain Healthcare, Murray, Utah.
David OvertonUniversity Healthcare Alliance, Newark, California.
Raj SrivastavaIntermountain Healthcare Delivery Institute, Intermountain Healthcare, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Steven M AschDivision of Primary Care and Population Health, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, California.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

purposeMedical assistants (MAs) have seen their roles expand as a result of team-based primary care models. Unlike their physician counterparts, MAs rarely receive financial incentives as a part of their compensation. This exploratory study aims to understand MA acceptability of financial incentives and perceived MA control over common population health measures.

methodsWe conducted semistructured focus groups between August and December of 2019 across 10 clinics affiliated with 3 institutions in California and Utah. MAs' perceptions of experienced and hypothetical financial incentives, their potential influence on workflow processes, and perceived levels of control over population health measures were discussed, recorded, and qualitatively analyzed for emerging themes. Perceived levels of control were further quantified using a Likert survey; measures were grouped into factors representing vaccinations, and workflow completed in the same day or multiple days (multiday

resultsMAs reported little direct experience with financial incentives. They indicated that a hypothetical bonus representing 2% to 3% of their average annual base pay would be acceptable and influential in improving consistent performance during patient rooming workflow. MAs reported having greater perceived control over vaccinations (

conclusionsMAs perceived that relatively small financial incentives would increase their motivation and quality of care. Our findings suggests target measures should focus on MA work processes that are completed in the same day as the patient encounter, particularly vaccinations. Future investigation is needed to understand the effectiveness of MA financial incentives in practice.

Indexed as

MotivationPopulation HealthHumansPrimary Health CareQuality Indicators, Health CareSurveys and Questionnairesbehavior changefinancial incentivesmedical assistantspopulation health measuresteam-based care

Identifiers

PMID34546949
PMCPMC8437570

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.