Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34525497›Full record

ArticleEpidemiology and health2021

COVID-19 Outbreak in a Military Unit in Korea.

Chanhee Kim, Young-Man Kim, Namwoo Heo, Eunjung Park, Sojin Choi, Nayoung Kim, Donghyok Kown, Young-Joon Park, Byeongseop Choi, Beomman Ha and 4 more

Open access · diamondAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Epidemiology and health, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
0.9field-weighted citation impact, top 25% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 6 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

14 authors at 4 institutions in 1 country.

Chanhee KimInfectious Disease Control Center, Gyeonggi Provincial Government, Suwon-si, Korea.
Young-Man KimCentral Disease Control Headquarters, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Korea.
Namwoo HeoInfectious Disease Control Center, Gyeonggi Provincial Government, Suwon-si, Korea.
Eunjung ParkInfectious Disease Control Center, Gyeonggi Provincial Government, Suwon-si, Korea.
Sojin ChoiInfectious Disease Control Center, Gyeonggi Provincial Government, Suwon-si, Korea.
Nayoung KimRegional Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Korea Disease Control & Prevention Agency, Seoul, Korea.
Donghyok KownCentral Disease Control Headquarters, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Korea.
Young-Joon ParkCentral Disease Control Headquarters, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Korea.
Byeongseop ChoiROK Armed Forces Medical Command, Republic of Korea Army, Seongnam, Korea.
Beomman HaROK Army Headquarter, Republic of Korea Army, Gyeryong, Korea.
Gyeonghwa JeongROK Army Headquarter, Republic of Korea Army, Gyeryong, Korea.
Changbo ParkROK Armed Forces Epidemiologic Investigation Center, Republic of Korea Army, Seongnam, Korea.
Sejin ParkROK Armed Forces Medical Command, Republic of Korea Army, Seongnam, Korea.
Heeyoung LeeCenter for Preventive Medicine and Public Health, Seoul National University Bundang Hospital, Seongnam, Korea.
Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency · KRRepublic of Korea Army · KRGovernment of the Republic of Korea · KRSeoul National University Bundang Hospital · KR

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectivesThis study presents the response of a military unit to the COVID-19 outbreak in Gyeonggi Province. As soon as two soldiers were identified as index cases, the infectious disease investigators of the Gyeonggi Provincial Government, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency and the Armed Forces Epidemiologic Investigation Center, discussed the investigation and response plan for an imminent massive outbreak.

methodsThe joint immediate response team (IRT) conducted interviews with confirmed patients with COVID-19, reviewed medical records, performed contact tracing using global positioning system (GPS), and undertook a field investigation. For risk assessment, the joint IRT visited all eight sites of the military units and the army chaplain's church to evaluate the transmission risk of each site. The evaluation items included the size of the site, the use of air conditioning, whether windows were opened, and whether masks were worn. A pooled testing was used for a low-risk population to quickly detect the spread of COVID-19 in the military base.

resultsA day before the symptom onset of the index case, the lecturer and >50% of the attendees were infected with COVID-19 while attending a lecture that lasted 2 h and 30 min. Attendees were not wearing masks and were in a poorly ventilated room.

conclusionSince the disease can be spread before symptom onset, contact tracing must be performed to investigate potential exposures prior to symptom onset and manage any exposed persons.

Indexed as

COVID-19Epidemiologic InvestigationMilitary-UnitOutbreak

Identifiers

PMID34525497
PMCPMC8689117
OpenAlexW3196584379

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.