Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34496760›Full record

ArticleBMC infectious diseases2021

Modelling testing and response strategies for COVID-19 outbreaks in remote Australian Aboriginal communities.

Ben B Hui, Damien Brown, Rebecca H Chisholm, Nicholas Geard, Jodie McVernon, David G Regan

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC infectious diseases, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
1.2field-weighted citation impact, top 22% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 14 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Demographic patterns of exposure and transmission for a rural Canadian community outbreak of COVID-19, 2020.Canada communicable disease report = Releve des maladies transmissibles au Canada · 2022
    Article
  7. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Ben B Hui *Kirby Institute, UNSW Sydney, Wallace Wurth Building, Sydney, NSW, Australia. bhui@kirby.unsw.edu.au.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6567-5821
Damien Brown *The Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, The Royal Melbourne Hospital and The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
Rebecca H ChisholmCentre for Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
Nicholas GeardThe Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, The Royal Melbourne Hospital and The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
Jodie McVernon *Centre for Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
David G Regan *Kirby Institute, UNSW Sydney, Wallace Wurth Building, Sydney, NSW, Australia.
The Royal Melbourne Hospital · AUThe University of Melbourne · AUUNSW Sydney · AU

Funding

National Health and Medical Research Council (AU) GNT1117140National Health and Medical Research Council (AU) GNT1170960
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundRemote Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities have potential to be severely impacted by COVID-19, with multiple factors predisposing to increased transmission and disease severity. Our modelling aims to inform optimal public health responses.

methodsAn individual-based simulation model represented SARS-CoV2 transmission in communities ranging from 100 to 3500 people, comprised of large, interconnected households. A range of strategies for case finding, quarantining of contacts, testing, and lockdown were examined, following the silent introduction of a case.

resultsMultiple secondary infections are likely present by the time the first case is identified. Quarantine of close contacts, defined by extended household membership, can reduce peak infection prevalence from 60 to 70% to around 10%, but subsequent waves may occur when community mixing resumes. Exit testing significantly reduces ongoing transmission. Concurrent lockdown of non-quarantined households for 14 days is highly effective for epidemic control and reduces overall testing requirements; peak prevalence of the initial outbreak can be constrained to less than 5%, and the final community attack rate to less than 10% in modelled scenarios. Lockdown also mitigates the effect of a delay in the initial response. Compliance with lockdown must be at least 80-90%, however, or epidemic control will be lost.

conclusionsA SARS-CoV-2 outbreak will spread rapidly in remote communities. Prompt case detection with quarantining of extended-household contacts and a 14 day lockdown for all other residents, combined with exit testing for all, is the most effective strategy for rapid containment. Compliance is crucial, underscoring the need for community supported, culturally sensitive responses.

Indexed as

COVID-19AustraliaCommunicable Disease ControlDisease OutbreaksHumansRNA, ViralSARS-CoV-2RNA, ViralCOVID-19Family and HouseholdHouseholdsIndigenous healthOutbreaksPatient IsolationQuarantine

Identifiers

PMID34496760
PMCPMC8424150
OpenAlexW3197435733

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.