Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34465830›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2021

The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity.

Laura Schmid, Pouya Shati, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
14citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

14 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  6. Article
  7. A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Evolution of norms for judging social behavior.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  11. Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Laura SchmidIST Austria, Am Campus 1, 3400, Klosterneuburg, Austria. lschmid@ist.ac.at.
Pouya ShatiDepartment of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, M5S, Canada.
Christian HilbeMax Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306, Ploen, Germany.
Krishnendu ChatterjeeIST Austria, Am Campus 1, 3400, Klosterneuburg, Austria.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other's behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied 'leading eight' social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.

Identifiers

PMID34465830
PMCPMC8408181

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.