Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34457352›Full record

ArticleNeuroscience of consciousness2021

Towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference.

Lars Sandved-Smith, Casper Hesp, Jérémie Mattout, Karl Friston, Antoine Lutz, Maxwell J D Ramstead

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Neuroscience of consciousness, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 43 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
43citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

43 citing papers in PubMed.

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  14. Born to act: Deferred action and desire as active inference.Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience · 2025
    Review
  15. Review
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. The role of affective states in computational psychiatry.The international journal of neuropsychopharmacology · 2025
    Review
  19. Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective.Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science · 2025
    Review
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Lars Sandved-SmithLyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France.
Casper HespDepartment of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, Netherlands.
Jérémie MattoutLyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France.
Karl FristonWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7984-8909
Antoine LutzLyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France.
Maxwell J D RamsteadWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK.

Funding

Wellcome Trust
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Meta-awareness refers to the capacity to explicitly notice the current content of consciousness and has been identified as a key component for the successful control of cognitive states, such as the deliberate direction of attention. This paper proposes a formal model of meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference. To do so, we cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states and add a further hierarchical level to model meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence (precision) in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. We simulate the example of mind-wandering and its regulation during a task involving sustained selective attention on a perceptual object. This provides a computational case study for an inferential architecture that is apt to enable the emergence of these central components of human phenomenology, namely, the ability to access and control cognitive states. We propose that this approach can be generalized to other cognitive states, and hence, this paper provides the first steps towards the development of a computational phenomenology of mental action and more broadly of our ability to monitor and control our own cognitive states. Future steps of this work will focus on fitting the model with qualitative, behavioural, and neural data.

Indexed as

active inferencefocused attentionfree energy principlemetacognitionmindfulnessmind-wanderingneurophenomenologyopacitytransparency

Identifiers

PMID34457352
PMCPMC8396119

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.