ArticleInternational journal of environmental research and public health2021
Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments.
Article in International journal of environmental research and public health, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.
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Who cites it
15 citing papers in PubMed.
- Evolutionary game model for public health emergency management in universities.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- Political cost, value balance, and the optimization of university public health emergency governance: an evolutionary game and small signal analysis.Frontiers in public health · 2026Article
- Natural disaster emergency response from a public policy perspective: a four-party evolutionary game among government, international organizations, healthcare institutions, and enterprises.Frontiers in public health · 2025Article
- Collaborative Governance Strategies for Fever Clinics: A Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game Analysis.Risk management and healthcare policy · 2025Article
- Evolutionary game analysis of multiple subjects in the management of major public health emergencies.Heliyon · 2024Article
- A study on the evolution of tripartite collaborative prevention and control under public health emergencies using COVID-19 as an example.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- Allocation strategy of medical supplies during a public health emergency: a tripartite evolutionary game perspective.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Resource Support for "Mobilization-Participation" in Public Health Emergencies Based on a Complex Network Evolutionary Game.Healthcare (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023Article
- Article
- Promotion Policies for Electric Vehicle Diffusion in China Considering Dynamic Consumer Preferences: A Network-Based Evolutionary Analysis.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022Article
- Agricultural Openness and the Risk of COVID-19 Incidence: Evidence from China.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022Article
- How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022Article
- How to promote the hierarchical diagnosis and treatment system: A tripartite evolutionary game theory perspective.Frontiers in psychology · 2022Article
- Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework.Frontiers in public health · 2022Article
- Hybrid Model-Based Simulation Analysis on the Effects of Social Distancing Policy of the COVID-19 Epidemic.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2021Article
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
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Abstract
In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.
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