ArticleFrontiers in public health2021
Environmental Regulation, Promotion Pressure of Officials, and Enterprise Environmental Protection Investment.
Article in Frontiers in public health, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Corporate Environmental Protection Behavior and Sustainable Development: The Moderating Role of Green Investors and Green Executive Cognition.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2023Article
- Precise Supervision of Enterprise Environmental Protection Behavior Based on Boolean Matrix Factorization under Low Carbon Background.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022Article
- Environmental Regulation, Environmental Decentralization, and Enterprise Environmental Protection Investment: Evidence From China.Frontiers in public health · 2022Article
- Is Cross-Shareholding Conducive to Corporate Sustainability? Evidence From the Environmental Investment of Chinese Listed Firms.Frontiers in psychology · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
7 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
This study expands on the impact of local government environmental regulation on enterprise environmental protection investment. Furthermore, it analyzes the influence promotion pressure of officials has on the scale of enterprise environmental investment. The results show that the environmental protection investment of companies in China is generally insufficient. The attitude of companies toward environmental protection is passive under the policy regulation. The environmental supervision of the government is also still at a low level. Both of these observations are far from the intentions of the government. There is a U-shaped relationship between the pressure of official promotion and the scale of enterprise environmental protection investment. Only when the pressure of official promotion exceeds a certain limit can it positively stimulate enterprises to invest in environmental protection. Environmental regulation also exerts a threshold effect on the environmental protection investment by enterprises. This research provides a new way to understand the decision-making behavior of local officials and the environmental protection responsibility of enterprises. This study provides recommendations for improving the environment appraisal and government supervision system in China.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.