ArticleiScience2021
Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons.
Article in iScience, 2021. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 18 papers.
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Who cites it
18 citing papers in PubMed.
- Revisiting institutional punishment in the N-person prisoner's dilemma.Theory in biosciences = Theorie in den Biowissenschaften · 2025Article
- A new electoral bottom-up model of institutional governance.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations.Bulletin of mathematical biology · 2024Article
- The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Success-driven opinion formation determines social tensions.iScience · 2024Article
- An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public-private partnership incorporating public participation.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations.Journal of mathematical biology · 2023Article
- Article
- Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks through asymmetry between interaction and replacement.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Article
- The coordination of collective and individual solutions in risk-resistant scenarios.The European physical journal. B · 2023Article
- Fast deliberation is related to unconditional behaviour in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma experiments.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2022Article
- Institutional incentives for the evolution of committed cooperation: ensuring participation is as important as enhancing compliance.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2022Article
- Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Supervision for the Public Health Services for Older Adults Under the Background of Government Purchasing: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Framework.Frontiers in public health · 2022Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
5 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical foundations, policy makers frequently impose a punishment-reward combination. Here, we consider the emergence of positive and negative incentives and analyze their simultaneous impact on sustaining risky commons. Importantly, we consider institutions with fixed and flexible incentives. We find that a local sanctioning scheme with pure reward is the optimal incentive strategy. It can drive the entire population toward a highly cooperative state in a broad range of parameters, independently of the type of institutions. We show that our finding is also valid for flexible incentives in the global sanctioning scheme, although the local arrangement works more effectively.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.