Evidence map›Paper›PMID 34376813›Full record

ArticleNeuropsychopharmacology : official publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology2022

Impulsivity and risk-seeking as Bayesian inference under dopaminergic control.

John G Mikhael, Samuel J Gershman

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Neuropsychopharmacology : official publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
0.9field-weighted citation impact, top 28% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 13 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. Resource-rational psychopathology.Behavioral neuroscience · 2024
    Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

John G MikhaelProgram in Neuroscience, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA. john_mikhael@hms.harvard.edu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7622-716X
Samuel J GershmanDepartment of Psychology and Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6546-3298
Boston University · USHarvard University · US

Funding

Medical Scientist Training ProgramT32GM007753 · NIGMS · HARVARD UNIVERSITY (MEDICAL SCHOOL) · PI WALENSKY, LOREN DAVID · 1985 to 2021
$50.0M
Towards a Unified Framework for Dopamine Signaling in the StriatumU19NS113201 · NINDS · HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL · PI SABATINI, BERNARDO L · 2019 to 2023
$18.7M
PHD TRAINING IN NEUROSCIENCET32MH020017 · NIMH · HARVARD UNIVERSITY (MEDICAL SCHOOL) · PI JOHN ASSAD · 1997 to 2026
$15.8M
NIGMS NIH HHS T32 GM007753NIMH NIH HHS T32 MH020017NINDS NIH HHS U19 NS113201
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Bayesian models successfully account for several of dopamine (DA)'s effects on contextual calibration in interval timing and reward estimation. In these models, tonic levels of DA control the precision of stimulus encoding, which is weighed against contextual information when making decisions. When DA levels are high, the animal relies more heavily on the (highly precise) stimulus encoding, whereas when DA levels are low, the context affects decisions more strongly. Here, we extend this idea to intertemporal choice and probability discounting tasks. In intertemporal choice tasks, agents must choose between a small reward delivered soon and a large reward delivered later, whereas in probability discounting tasks, agents must choose between a small reward that is always delivered and a large reward that may be omitted with some probability. Beginning with the principle that animals will seek to maximize their reward rates, we show that the Bayesian model predicts a number of curious empirical findings in both tasks. First, the model predicts that higher DA levels should normally promote selection of the larger/later option, which is often taken to imply that DA decreases 'impulsivity,' and promote selection of the large/risky option, often taken to imply that DA increases 'risk-seeking.' However, if the temporal precision is sufficiently decreased, higher DA levels should have the opposite effect-promoting selection of the smaller/sooner option (higher impulsivity) and the small/safe option (lower risk-seeking). Second, high enough levels of DA can result in preference reversals. Third, selectively decreasing the temporal precision, without manipulating DA, should promote selection of the larger/later and large/risky options. Fourth, when a different post-reward delay is associated with each option, animals will not learn the option-delay contingencies, but this learning can be salvaged when the post-reward delays are made more salient. Finally, the Bayesian model predicts correlations among behavioral phenotypes: Animals that are better timers will also appear less impulsive.

Indexed as

Delay DiscountingDopamineAnimalsBayes TheoremChoice BehaviorImpulsive BehaviorRewardDopamine

Identifiers

PMID34376813
PMCPMC8674258
OpenAlexW3191760833

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.