Cognitive efficiency beats top-down control as a reliable individual difference dimension relevant to self-control.

Top-down control of responses is a key construct in cognitive science that is thought to be critical for self-control. It is typically measured by subtracting performance in experimental conditions in which top-down control is theoretically present against performance in matched conditions in which it is assumed to be absent. Recently, however, subtraction-based metrics of top-down control have been criticized for having low test-retest reliability, weak intercorrelations, and little relation to self-report measures of self-control. Concurrently, there is growing evidence that task-general cognitive efficiency, indexed by the drift rate parameter of the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978), constitutes a cohesive, reliable individual difference dimension relevant to self-control. However, no previous studies have directly compared latent factors for top-down control (derived from subtraction metrics) with factors for task-general efficiency "head-to-head" in the same sample in terms of their cohesiveness, temporal stability, and relation to self-control. In this re-analysis of a large open data set (Eisenberg et al., 2019; N = 522), we find that top-down control metrics fail to form cohesive latent factors, that the resulting factors have poor temporal stability, and that they exhibit tenuous connections to questionnaire measures of self-control. In contrast, cognitive efficiency measures-drawn from conditions of the same tasks that both are, and are not, assumed to demand top-down control-form a robust, temporally stable factor that correlates with questionnaire measures of self-control. These findings suggest that task-general efficiency is a central individual difference dimension relevant to self-control. Moreover, they go beyond recent measurement-based critiques of top-down control metrics, and instead suggest problems with key theoretical assumptions that have long guided this research paradigm.